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WHY BLACKMAIL SHOULD BE
CRIMINALIZED: A REPLY TO WALTER
BLOCK AND DAVID GORDON
Debra J. Campbell*
I. INTRODUCTION
In an article entitled Blackmail, Extortion and Free Speech,' Walter
Block and David Gordon offer what they feel is the conclusive argument
to a debate about blackmail.2 The debate centers around the following
question: In a capitalist society, why should blackmail be criminalized?
The positions of those engaged in the debate range from those who claim
blackmail should be criminalized simply because it is immoral to those
who claim that there is no clear distinction between blackmail and other
hard economic transactions; therefore criminalization of blackmail is
unjustified.
In order to review the course of the debate without going into too
much detail, I have divided my argument into four sections. In the first
section I briefly summarize the "paradox" of blackmail which has fueled
the current debate. The second section outlines various justifications for
criminalizing blackmail which have been put forth, but which have been
proven to be inadequate after careful analysis. In the third section, I
present in more detail Block and Gordon's attempted resolution to the
debate and criticize their argument. I hope to convince the reader that,
although Block and Gordon's argument form is valid, the argument is
unsound for at least two reasons: (1) one of their premises is clearly
false, and (2) another premise is merely assumed when it needs to be
argued for. Finally, in the fourth section, I argue that blackmail transac-
tions can be distinguished in principle from legitimate economic transac-
tions. Consequently, by means of a contract form of argument of the sort
developed by John Rawls,3 the prohibition of blackmail can be justified
while other hard economic transactions remain permissible.
* Graduate Teaching Assistant, Arizona State University, Department of Philosophy.
B.A. 1985, University of Texas, Austin.
1. Block & Gordon, Blackmail, Extortion and Free Speech. A Reply to Posner, Epstein,
Nozick and Lindgren, 19 LOY. L.A.L. REv. 37 (1985).
2. Block and Gordon contend that blackmail is only a permissible threat and since per-
missible threats are legal, blackmail should be legal. Id.
3. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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II. THE ARGUMENT
A. The Paradox of Blackmail Revisited
In Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, Murphy asks: What is it
about blackmail that distinguishes it from other hard economic transac-
tions?4 If we can discover some clear distinction between the two, then
perhaps we can explain why blackmail is criminalized while other hard
economic transactions, which seem as morally offensive as blackmail, are
legal. For the purposes of this paper, following Murphy and others, I
shall identify blackmail as "reputational extortion." A person commits
the crime of reputational extortion if he "demands money or other valua-
ble consideration under the threat of exercising his right of free speech by
publicizing someone else's secret without use of the threat of force or
violence."5 Murphy argues that criminalizing blackmail seems "para-
doxical" because the blackmailer merely threatens to do something
which he has the right to do, namely, reveal some true information. But
this threat of warning becomes a criminal offense if joined with a demand
for money. Thus, the "paradox of blackmail" is as follows:
Since all the blackmailer threatens to do is something which he
has the right to do, why should we prohibit him from making
the threat and tying the threat to a demand for money-partic-
ularly since the victim, given the legally permitted alternative,
is often happy to have the opportunity to respond to such a
threat?
6
If this is an accurate and complete description of a blackmail transaction,
then perhaps the state is just wrong to make blackmail a criminal offense.
In fact, this paradox has led Block and Gordon to argue -that blackmail
should not be criminalized. I shall discuss their argument at length in
the third section. For now, I must briefly digress and review the more
common reasons given for criminalizing blackmail.
4. Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, 63 THE MONIST 156, 156-57 (1980).
Murphy gives the following example of a hard, perhaps immoral, economic transaction: Your
son is dying of leukemia and his last wish is to own a baseball autographed by Babe Ruth. I
happen to own such a baseball. I find out that $6,000 is your entire life's savings, and I offer to
sell you the baseball for $6,000. Murphy claims that the father in this case is under no less
pressure than any blackmail victim. Therefore, why is this type of transaction legal, and black-
mail not?
5. Block & Gordon, supra note 1, at 37. See also Mack, In Defense of Blackmail, 41
PHIL. STUD. 274 (1982) (providing argument that secret information must be true and black-
mailer must have acquired information innocently).
6. Murphy, supra note 4, at 160.
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B. The Inadequate Justifications
First, I want to deny, with Murphy and others, that the immoral
nature of blackmail alone is a sufficiently good reason for criminalizing
it.' Second, attempts to prove that blackmail violates a specific private
property right of the victim have been equally fruitless.' I also reject
Murphy's proposal that "immorality plus disutility is a reasonable basis
for criminalization" 9 for the reasons given in an argument by Eric
Mack.10
Robert Nozick's suggestion-that blackmail be prohibited because it
is an "unproductive economic exchange" is ruled out for at least two
reasons. 1' The first is argued by Murphy: All blackmail transactions are
not "unproductive" in Nozick's sense. 2 The second is a more obvious
objection: even if all and only blackmail transactions are "unproduc-
tive," one still would have to justify why non-productivity is an adequate
justification for criminalization. Finally, any argument to criminalize
blackmail because it involves a "coercive threat" is rejected by Murphy
on the grounds that the threat of a blackmailer is not really a "coercive
threat."' 3 I agree with Murphy in concluding that if one accepts Hak-
sar's definition of a "coercive threat," then the threat which is an explicit
part of any blackmail transaction is not "coercive." However, in the last
section of this paper, I argue that blackmail can be distinguished from
other hard economic transactions because it involves not a "coercive
threat," but a "coercive offer."
C. Block and Gordon's Proposal
The inadequacy of the justifications presented above has prompted
Walter Block and David Gordon to argue that there is no good justifica-
7. Block & Gordon, supra note 1, at 53. See also Murphy, supra note 4, at 163.
8. Block & Gordon, supra note 1, at 38 n.8. See also Mack, supra note 3, at 274; Murphy,
supra note 4, at 160; Lindgren, In Defense of Keeping Blackmail A Crime: Responding to Block
and Gordon, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 35, 37 (1986).
9. Murphy, supra note 4, at 163.
10. Mack's argument, in part, is that some hard economic transactions, such as boycotts,
are no different in principle from blackmail. If immorality in conjunction with social disutility
does not justify prohibiting boycotts, then it also does not justify criminalizing blackmail.
11. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 85 (1974).
12. Murphy, supra note 4, at 158. Murphy provides an example in which the blackmailer
is better off if the victim is able to buy the blackmailer's silence. This is a counter-example to
Nozick's claim that blackmail transactions are unproductive.
13. Murphy follows V. Haksar's definition of a "coercive threat." A threat is coercive if
the threatener's unilateral plan of action, should the offeree decline the offer, is morally imper-
missible. Id. at 156. See also Haksar, Coercive Proposals [Rawis and Gandhi], 4 POL. THEORY
65, 68-69 (1976).
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tion for making blackmail a criminal offense, and thus, it should be
legal. " They argue that since the blackmailer is only threatening to do
something (reveal some true information) which he has a right to do,
"blackmail" is nothing more than a permissible threat:
If a person has the right to do X, then he necessarily has the
right to give warning of the fact that he will do or may do X-
that is, to threaten to do X. Blackmail is thus a noncriminal
act.15
There are numerous problems with this argument. Although the form of
the argument is valid, an analysis of the content of their argument reveals
the weaknesses of the premises offered. The content of the argument is as
follows:
1. If one threatens to do what one has a right to do, then the
threat is permissible and should be legal.
2. If something is only a permissible threat, then it also
should be legal.
3. Blackmail is only threatening to do what one has a right to
do.
Therefore,
4. Blackmail should be legal.
There are at least two ways to attack this argument. First, if one denies
that blackmail is only threatening to do what one has a right to do, then
the argument fails because the third premise is false. I plan to prove this
in the next section of the paper by arguing that the blackmailer actually
does two things, offers and threatens, and that the offer should be ana-
lyzed independently of the attendant threat. However, even if blackmail
were no more than a permissible threat, that alone would not prove that
it should be legal. Thus, the first premise of Block and Gordon's argu-
ment needs to be argued for, not just assumed.
D. The Coercive Offer
I begin my analysis of the blackmail transaction with the black-
mailer's initial offer. The offer that the blackmailer proposes to the vic-
tim is in form the same as any offer proposing a legitimate economic
exchange: A offers to B some product (in the case of blackmail, silence)
in exchange for some consideration (usually money). Although any con-
tract resulting from a blackmail offer is void, this does not tell us why the
14. Block & Gordon, supra note 1, at 38.
15. Id.
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offer itself is (or should be) deemed criminal and prohibited.16 Not
enough attention has been given to the fact that in any proposed eco-
nomic exchange (including blackmail), the offer can be analyzed apart
from any implicit or explicit attendant threat and/or any resultant
exchange.
In fact, to distinguish legitimate economic exchanges from cases of
blackmail one must disregard the threat involved and look carefully at
the offer. Discussions of blackmail which focused on whether the attend-
ant threat was permissible or impermissible17 have tended to obscure the
real difference between these two types of economic transactions, that is,
whether the offer creates a legitimate or a coerced choice.
In order to explain what I mean by a "coerced choice," I shall begin
by reviewing some pertinent information from a recent article which con-
trasted clear-cut cases of criminal coercion with cases of blackmail. The
difference between criminal coercion and blackmail is clearly described
in the essay Coercion, Blackmail, and Free Speech. 8 The commentator
contrasts the Oregon statutes that prohibit criminal coercion 9 with the
statutes that prohibit blackmail.2" First, it is interesting to note that sep-
arate statutes prohibit these two activities, and thus it seems that black-
mail is treated as distinguishable from and not merely a type of criminal
coercion. Second, in the article, "coercive speech" is defined as "speech
forcing the listener to choose between two things when the listener has a
16. "A contract entered into under excessive or undue influence lacks genuine assent and
is therefore voidable." G. JENTZ, K. CLARKSON & R. MILLER, WEST'S BUSINESS LAW 156
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (2d ed. 1984)).
17. Block and Gordon assert that if a person has the right to do X, he necessarily has the
right to give warning of the fact that he will do or may do X-that is, to threaten to do X. This
I shall term a "permissible threat." Conversely, an "impermissible threat" is a warning to do
something that one has no right to do. Block & Gordon, supra note 1, at 38.
18. Comment, Coercion, Blackmail, and the Limits of Protected Speech, 131 U. PA. L.
REv. 1469 (1983).
19. The Oregon Revised Statute § 163.275 prohibits criminal coercion. The statute states:
(1) A person commits the crime of coercion when he compels or induces another
person to engage in conduct from which he has a legal right to abstain ... by means
of instilling in him a fear that, if the demand is not complied with, the act of another,
will:
(e) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to
subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule ....
OR. REv..STAT. § 163.275 (1981).
20. For the statute prohibiting blackmail, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1980). The
statute provides: "A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of another by
threatening to: ... (3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or
ridicule, or to impair his credit or business reputation." Id. Comment, supra note 18, at 1470
(quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1980)).
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legitimate claim to both things."21 To bring this to bear on the issue of
blackmail, I suggest that someone is proposing an offer that entails a
"coerced choice" if his purpose is to force the listener to choose between
two things when he (the listener) has a legitimate claim to both things.
For the purposes of my argument, an offer is "coercive" if the of-
feror creates a coerced choice for the offeree. Someone is the victim of a
coerced choice if he has to choose between two things, both of which he
had a right to before the offeror came on the scene.22 For example, some
person V has a right to both X (his money) and Y (his secret). The per-
son making the offer, call him B, has a concurrent right to Y (in the case
of blackmail, the blackmailer has the right to publish true information
about the victim). B is attempting to force V to choose between relin-
quishing his (V's) right to eitherX or Y. The important thing to notice is
that an offer is coercive only in the case that it creates a coerced choice,
and regardless of whether or not that choice is linked with a permissible or
impermissible threat.
As opposed to this, one person offers to another a "legitimate
choice" if he proposes to exchange freely his right to some thing with the
other person's right to some thing. Thus, a legitimate offer is a proposal
to exchange rights to some thing(s), in which each person has a right to
the thing they propose to exchange and no right to the other person's
thing. Notice that a legitimate offer creates a legitimate choice, but that
the legitimate choice is joined with either an implicit or explicit permissi-
ble threat.
To render this more concrete, contrast three types of offers: (1) the
one which is used in clear cases of criminal coercion; (2) the offer which
proposes a legal economic exchange; and (3) the offer which the black-
mailer makes.
L Criminal Coercion -
Offer: Give me your money or I will take your dog.
The offer in a clear case of criminal coercion links a coerced
choice with an impermissible threat. Coerced choice: I have a
21. Comment, supra note 18, at 1471.
22. For the purposes of my argument, "right" will mean what J. Feinberg describes'as a
"passive right," i.e., I have a legitimate claim to the use of a thing and you have a correspond-
ing duty not to interfere with my use of it. This raises two points. First, this "right" is not a
claim to the exclusive use of a thing, since I will be discussing the right to information. Many
people may have a right to the information with no one person having an exclusive right. The
second point is that you have a duty not to interfere only with my use of the information. This
does not mean that you may not use the same information, or correspondingly that I have any
right to interfere with your use of it. J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 60 (1973).
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right to my money and to my dog and you ask me to give up
one or the other, though you have no right to either. Imper-
missible threat: you have no right to threaten to take my dog.
2. Legal Economic Exchange -
Offer: Give me your money or I (a store owner) keep this new
set of golf clubs.
The offer in the case of a legitimate economic exchange links a
legitimate choice with apermissible threat. Legitimate choice: I
have a right to my money, you have a right to the golf clubs
and you propose that we freely choose to exchange those rights.
Permissible threat: you have a right to threaten to keep the golf
clubs.
3. Blackmail -
Offer: Give me your money or I will expose your secret.
The offer in the case of blackmail joins a coerced choice and a
permissible threat. Coerced choice: I have a right to my money
and my secret and you ask me to relinquish one of those rights,
just because you also have a right to my secret. Permissible
threat: you have a right to threaten to tell my secret.
If one really wants to know if blackmail should be criminalized, the
relevant question is, should the blackmailer be prohibited from making
an offer which links a coerced choice with a permissible threat? Those
who want to criminalize blackmail say "yes." Those who want to legal-
ize blackmail say "no." I shall argue that society criminalizes blackmail
because it has an interest in prohibiting coerced choices. Nevertheless, I
think it should now be obvious that Block and Gordon's premise, that
blackmail is just a permissible threat, is false. The above analysis should
convince the reader that the permissible threat present in cases of reputa-
tional extortion is only a part of the transaction, not the entire story.
Before I argue why society should prohibit blackmail, further discussion
should be made about the "coercive offer" which distinguishes blackmail
from legitimate economic exchanges.
Notice that the blackmail scenario has an asymmetry of rights that
is not found in the case of criminal coercion or legal economic exchanges.
In the clear case of criminal coercion, the victim has all the rights and
the coercer has none. In the case of legitimate economic exchange each
person has one right which they propose to exchange. In the case of
blackmail, the victim has two rights but the blackmailer also has a right
to one of the things the victim has a right to, i.e., the information. Since
April 1988]
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one of the victim's rights happens to be something to which the black-
mailer also has a right, the blackmailer asks (forces) the victim to choose
between his rights. In the case of blackmail, the victim must give up one
of his rights (his money or his secret) or suffer the consequences of non-
compliance. The victim may feel that the price of dissent is minimal and
as Block and Gordon put it, may say "Publish and be damned."2 How-
ever, regardless of whether the proposed unilateral action by the black-
mailer is immoral, intrusive, or even illegal, the offeree is the "victim" of
a coercive offer just in case the offeror created a coerced choice for the
offeree.
Murphy has objected that the person being blackmailed has no
"right" to his secret.24 Following Joel Feinberg, I claim that information
about oneself is not just a liberty, but actually a right.2" Feinberg argues
that "what the right adds to the liberty is the duty of others not to inter-
fere."26 Feinberg classifies the right to "keep one's affairs secret, or one's
reputation undamaged" as a passive right, that is, the right "not to be
done to by others."27 Notice that my argument for the criminalization of
blackmail does not require that the victim's right to true information
about himself be a right of exclusivity or a right to privacy. Others have
argued convincingly that if the blackmailer came across the information
innocently then it is impossible to prove that the blackmailer has invaded
the victim's privacy.2" Likewise, it would be very difficult if not impossi-
ble, to show that some true information about a person is for his exclu-
sive use while other information is not. It is enough for my argument
that the victim's right to information about himself is a right only be-
cause others have a duty not to interfere with his use of the information.
It does not follow from the fact that the blackmailer has a duty not to
interfere with the victim's right to have and use information about him-
self, that the victim has exclusive right to or use of the information. This
is exactly what makes blackmail so interesting. Both the blackmailer and
the victim have a passive right to the information, in the same way that
all taxpayers have a right to use public parks. My argument is that the
blackmailer forces the victim to choose between two of the victim's
23. Block & Gordon, supra note 1, at 39 (attributing quote to A. Wellesley, Duke of Wel-
lington, when his mistress threatened to publish her diary and his letters. J. BARTLETT, FA-
MILIAR QUOTATIONS 506a (1968)).
24. This objection was raised by Professor J. G. Murphy during a personal conversation
with him at Arizona State University, May, 1987.
25. J. FEINBERG, supra note 22, at 60.
26. Id. at 58.
27. Id. at 60.
28. Block & Gordon, supra note 1, at 38; Murphy, supra note 4, at 159-60.
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rights-his right to his money and his right to his use of the information
about himself and that this coerced choice is what society has an interest
in prohibiting. Thus, I need only prove that the victim has a right (even
if only a passive, non-exclusive one) to the information about himself, not
that the victim has an exclusive right to his secret, or that the black-
mailer violates such a right.
By focusing on the distinction between a legitimate offer and a coer-
cive offer we can now separate blackmail from the type of economic ex-
changes that we want to protect. An economic exchange that consists of
a legitimate offer and a permissible threat is a symmetrical exchange in
which the power is balanced. I exchange my money for your golf
clubs-period. Even a hard economic transaction, such as the one in
Murphy's baseball example is now easily distinguished from a case of
blackmail because the offer to sell you my baseball for $6,000 is a legiti-
mate offer not a coercive one." My offer to sell you the baseball is not
coercive because in making the offer I am not forcing you to choose be-
tween two things to which you already have a right. You have a right to
your money, but you have no legitimate claim to my baseball.
In the case of blackmail, the offer includes a coerced choice. The
blackmailer by his offer forces me to choose between two things, both of
which I had a right to before he came on the scene. He is offering me the
opportunity to buy his right to the information (or re-buy my right to the
information). This "coerced choice," which is always present in a black-
mailer's offer, is what we want to isolate and prohibit.
If we accept the above distinction between legitimate and coercive
offers, then we can state a Rawlsian argument for criminalizing black-
mail.3" Rational self-interested persons, behind a veil of ignorance,
would choose to prohibit blackmail because they would choose not to be
subjected to coercive offers. Persons in Rawls' original position3 would
have to choose between the following: If coercive offers are legal, then I
29. In Murphy's baseball example, I have a right to the baseball and the father has a right
to his money. My offer to exchange the two is non-coercive because I am not forcing him to
choose between two things he already had a right to. The father only had a right to his money,
and had no right to my baseball. If we did make the exchange, and the courts later found the
price of $6,000 "unconscionable" or thought that the father was under "undue psychological
pressure," then the father could be awarded civil remedies. Murphy, supra note 4, at 156-57.
30. A Rawlsian contract argument states that a moral principle is justified if rational, self-
interested persons ignorant of their identity and circumstances would support it. See J.
RAwLS, supra note 3.
31. Rawls' original position is similar to the hypothetical state of nature in traditional
social contract theory, in which a group of free and rational persons in an initial position of
equality come together and in one act choose principles of social cooperation. See J. RAWLS,
supra note 3.
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have the right to constantly try to force people into coerced choices. If
coercive offers are illegal I may never benefit from forcing someone into a
coerced choice, but I also do not have to risk being subjected to coerced
choices myself. If you assume that people prefer security over risk, then
it seems clear that we are all better off in a state in which none of us can
blackmail, than one in which all of us can. Additionally, it seems that we
would want to prohibit the type of coercive offer present in the blackmail
scenario for the same reasons that we want to prohibit other unfair trade
practices, such as private monopolies and usurious interest rates. If the
offeror builds into his offer a coerced choice, then our ability to contract
freely is limited. Thus we would justify prohibiting coercive offers not
only because we are interested in security (not having to fear that we may
become victims of blackmail) but because members of a capitalist society
are interested in protecting their ability to contract freely.
III. CONCLUSION
To restate the argument: The offer in a typical blackmail transac-
tion is a "coercive offer" because it creates a coerced choice for the vic-
tim, even though the attendant threat is a permissible threat. Remember
that in the case of a coerced choice, the victim is faced with giving up one
of his rights because the blackmailer has a concurrent right to one of
those things. The offer proposed in a legitimate economic exchange is a
legitimate offer because it creates a legitimate choice (there are no con-
current rights by which one party may coerce the other). This legitimate
choice may or may not be accompanied by a permissible threat. Black-
mail transactions can be distinguished from legitimate economic transac-
tions by determining whether the offer which proposes the transaction is
a legitimate offer or a coercive offer. Though society has no interest in
prohibiting permissible threats, society does have an interest in prohibit-
ing coercive offers because they interfere with a person's ability to con-
tract freely. Therefore, the state should prohibit blackmail, which
includes a coercive offer, while allowing other legal economic transac-
tions which include only legitimate offers.
